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Architecture not conceptual but Ideational 
 
 
 
Deleuze, in Difference & Repetition
1, opposes Idea to concept, and outlines an idea of 
the Idea in terms of a complex interweaving of what he terms differentiation and 
differenciation – two words separated by an unhearable consonant.  It is by this 
interweaving of differentiation and differenciation that the work comes to exist.  How 
does this relate to architecture, and how does Idea contrast with concept?  What would 
be the difference between an Ideational architecture and a conceptual architecture? 
 
By concept we mean that of which Laugier
2 for instance classically speaks when he 
begins his essay with a chapter entitled  “General Principles of Architecture”: 
 
It is the same in architecture as in all other arts: its principles are founded on 
simple nature, and nature’s process clearly indicates it rules…. Such is the 
course of simple nature; by imitating the natural process, art was born.  All the 
splendours of architecture ever conceived have been modelled on the little rustic 
hut
3 
 
We take Laugier as exemplary of the conceptual notion of architecture, but the structure 
of thought implied and used here is common to all those who would apply the following 
strategy, either implicitly or explicitly: 
•  the notion of “general principles of architecture” or an initial “generating idea” 
•  the notion of “a central concept at the core of an architectural project” 
•  the idea that architecture (or any work) might “express” or illustrate a more 
“fundamental” philosophy, thought, concept or feeling 
•  more generally, the notion that there is a “founding” concept or thing (such as 
“nature”) from which architecture would be derived or would derive itself 
 
In other words, the classical notion of architecture which we will here questioned via 
Deleuze is essentially a notion that stays within a metaphysical philosophy of 
representation.  Within such a philosophy architecture’s task would be to represent some 
pre-existing thought or thing (concept, society, life…).  Given that Deleuze spent his 
entire work countering representational thought, it is no surprise that he be cited in the 
countering of this classical means of structuring architecture.   This countering will 
oppose the thought of architecture as that of static “firm principles” determining the 
architect’s judgement; it will oppose the concept of architecture which exists within the 
realm of representation; it will oppose a concept of architecture subsumed to the 
concept from which it derives; and it will oppose the thought that thought is, finally, 
merely expressed in the work. 
 
We might have attempted the opposition by means of the by now familiar move of 
deconstruction.  This move would have addressed the issue of foundations in Laugier 
and would have asked immediately: by what right can Laugier claim that architecture is 
founded on “simple nature”, since the notion of foundation is dependent both on 
something like architecture - ie a construction which has a foundation – and furthermore 
on the artificial notion of a footing, since we do not claim that a tree or some other such 
supposed “natural thing” has a “foundation”.  Laugier’s argument is therefore doubly 
weak; he wishes to establish architecture by means of a notion which derives from 
architecture itself (thus leading to a vicious logical circle) and therefore carries out no 
 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, trans Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 
1994) 
2 Marc-Antoine Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, trans W & A Herrmann (Los Angeles: 
Hennessey & Ingalls, 1977) 
3 pp. 11-12. 
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such foundation; and the specific notion he uses – “nature” as that which pre-exists the 
artificial – is also undermined by the artificiality of the notion of foundation.  But Laugier 
is not alone here: the supposed metaphorical use of architectural terms runs as we know 
through all philosophy and thought and undoes any attempt to derive architecture from 
philosophy.  It would also be possible to show that any classical or representational 
thought about architecture suffers the same limitation; it will leave itself open to being 
deconstructed. 
 
Indeed it is no co-incidence that those representational structures that Deleuze critiques 
will be open to a Derridian deconstruction; both thinkers made it their task to question 
foundational thought by means of a differential one, and it would perhaps suffice here to 
note that Derrida, in his 1968 essay Differánce uses the same strategy of a neologism 
(“differánce”) which can only be distinguished from the word “difference” in writing, just 
as Deleuze utilises the difference between two “different/ciations” (one spelt with a t, 
one with a c) which can also only be perceived by writing.  Derrida, in his appreciation of 
Deleuze written after the latter’s death, claimed indeed that no-one was closer to him. 
 
It is therefore ironic that in the case of both deconstruction and the thought of Gilles 
Deleuze we find baleful attempts on the part of architects and architectural theorists to 
“apply” their thought to architecture, to build the form of which these thoughts will 
supposedly provide the theoretical justification.  Any attempt to represent a thought or a 
philosophy in something like architecture is, we would argue, naïve; it is doubly naïve in 
this instance because both of these thinkers were specifically and endlessly overturning 
the representational structure within which this attempt is made.  Thus architecture, 
thought outside the classical bind, can never be the translation of an apparently formal 
aspect of philosophy (the fold, for instance) into the form of architecture. 
 
We would not, however, return the question simply to one of metaphoricity.  It is not the 
case that we can say that Laugier’s notion of a “foundation” is simply the metaphorical 
usage of a word properly belonging to the realm of architecture.  Nor, to generalise, it is 
the case that when philosophy uses terms from architecture – as when Kant famously 
has it that the treatise must be set out according to an architectonic plan
4 - this is simply 
a metaphorical usage.  To posit architecture as simply pre-existing philosophy and 
providing a series of metaphorical terms taken from the “proper” and “natural” realm of 
architecture is to be as naïve as Laugier is in doing the opposite; and it is again to remain 
within an representational mode of thought. 
 
Deleuze, in opposing the Idea to the concept and showing how a process of 
differenc/tation occurs in the creation of a work, provides a clue as to how to think other 
than within this representational mode – a mode within which the notion of the 
metaphor gains it strength.  The Idea, for Deleuze, operates within a field which is riven 
from the outset by difference rather than identity.  The overcoming of representation is 
the assertion that it is difference which is primary, not identity.  Classical philosophy 
asserts that it is identity which comes first, and from identity differences are then 
derived.  For Deleuze, this does not take sufficiently seriously the post-Nietzschian 
situation, for in retaining the privilege of identity we unknowingly fail to take seriously 
the cry of the madman announcing the death of god – that is, the death of identity 
which, in the end, is only justified by something like the godhead.  Difference, Deleuze 
states, is primary; difference is that from which identity is derived.  This is the profound 
meaning of Nietzsche’s eternal return of the same.  This movement is not the return of a 
pre-existing identity, a pre-existent “sameness”; rather, the genitive “of” is taken in the 
other sense and indicates that it is eternal return, ie eternal difference, which allows the 
same to come to exist.  Again we see here a clear affiliation with Derrida’s though, 
which operates as a constant questioning of foundations, origins and identities in the 
 
4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans Norman Kemp Smith (London: 
Macmillan, 1933), p. 33. 
a paper by Tim Gough   page 2 of 4 Architecture not conceptual but ideational 
 
                                            
name of “differánce”, ie in the name of a primary and abyssal difference prior to any 
identity. 
 
Within the field of original difference, the Deleuzian Idea operates as an anti-classical, 
anti-representational, anti-expressionist and genetic (anti-static) movement.  It is this by 
virtue of its status not as arché (principle) but as differentialising problem.   As is said of 
art in Ozenfant/Jeanneret’s Purism manifesto, architecture as Idea raises space to the 
level of mathesis, and it does this as a genesis, as a development of the Idea by virtue of 
the process of differentiation (of the Idea as problem) and differenciation (of the 
actualisation of this).  This genetic movement of differentiation and differenciation can 
be summarised thus: 
•  the Idea is acknowledged to be not a concept (ie something identical in itself 
derived from Ideas after the fact) but rather something having a problematic 
nature such that the supposed “solution” to the problem does not disappear but 
stays in play.  As Deleuze says, “true problems are ideas, not disappearing with 
their solutions”
5.  Thus, in the creative act that is architecture, we can say that 
an Idea is set up, ie that a problem is posed in such a manner that it remains 
problematic, it remains open.  This is the moment of differentiation (spelt with a 
t) 
•  at the same time, this Idea, in setting up a movement of problem-solution which 
stays as movement and does not resolve into the stasis of the solution, becomes 
actualised in the process of differenciation (spelt with c).  That is, in terms of 
architecture, the posed and retained problem will come to be actualised in a work 
where the differential movement of the problem is maintained and respected 
 
We can say that in the case of architecture (as with other works) this genesis is a 
creative “triple genesis” of qualities, space and time, and concepts, to use the 
terminology Deleuze applies to another field
6.  The qualities which arise when 
architecture is actualised at the same time that the Idea is posed also allows space and 
time to realise themselves in this particular work in a particular way; and the concept 
occurs as part of this movement, as a derived reality that can subsequently, if we wish, 
be abstracted from the work and from the Idea. 
 
Thus we can see that architecture, as such a creative movement, does not follow 
concepts but rather generates them.  A truly conceptual architecture does not begin, but 
ends, with the concept.  This notion of architecture is an inherently non-conceptual one.  
It is non-conceptual because it does not operate by positing a pre-defined conceptual 
ground which then comes to be represented in the work of architecture.  This conceptual 
ground would act to close the work in subordinating it to the identical – that is, to the 
concept as something identified, identifiable and predefined.  The work should instead 
remain open in its respect of its primary difference, a primary movement and a primary 
resonance.  Such a work would be inherently Ideational.  Again, we emphasis that the 
“concept” can be derived from this Ideational movement, but only in a later act of 
analysis.  Thus the Ideational work of architecture is, we could say, more conceptual 
than conceptual architecture strictly defined.  It hyperbolises the concept, makes it 
larger, more grand, more open and more rich than the one which derives from a static, 
pre-defined or essentially analytic tradition.  And not only does the movement of the 
Ideational work occur during the activity of the supposed creators in the sense that the 
idea of it only ever comes to exist through the movement of its creation; but this 
Ideational movement extends into the creative response of those who come after that 
moment of creation, who indeed have been given space by means of it, who come to 
inhabit it. 
 
 
5 Deleuze, p. 168 
6 p. 173 
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In short, Ideational architecture operates on us “by posing the question of its own 
difference”
7 and maintaining the movement of that question within a primary differential 
field.  The Idea of this architecture only ever exists in and through its so-called 
“concrete” realisation, even though it is at the same time that which allows such 
realisation to occur.  This is why we can say that the classic representational structure 
of thought about architecture can and must be overturned, it we are to affirm a truly 
creative and open work of architecture.  This overturning occurs in the very act of 
creation, and does so by refusing the concept, that is refusing a pre-defined ground or 
foundation which architecture could display, represent, or express.  The concept is a 
reduction; it can be derived after the fact of architecture.  This means, as with all 
reductions, that architecture (that from which it is reduced) cannot be reduced to it, 
cannot be derived from it.  This would be to move in precisely the wrong direction. 
 
But we would be mistaken here if we try to understand these workings within a 
conventional, object-like notion of the ontology of architecture.  The operation of 
differentiation in posing the problem of architecture’s “own difference”, and the 
operation of differenciation in actualising this problem within qualities, space and time, 
and concepts, occurs not within an objective field but within an ontology of the event.  
This thought of the different/ciating work only works if we allow that architecture is not 
essentially material, substantial, spatial or objective (these being derived reductions of it) 
but rather eventful. Deleuze, in a beautiful rendering in section 15 of Logic of Sense
8, 
relates how the battle of war is the essential event: 
 
  ….the battle is not an example of an event among others, but rather the Event in 
its essence…. because it is actualised in diverse manners at once, and because 
each participant may grasp it at a different level of actualisation within its 
variable present….. (And) it is above all because the battle hovers over its own 
field, neutral in relation to the victor and the vanquished, the coward and the 
brave; because of this, it is all the more terrible.  Never present but always yet to 
come and already passed, the battle is graspable only by the will of anonymity 
which it itself inspires.
9 
 
Architecture is such a thing; never present, always yet to come and already passed, 
actualised in diverse manners at once, and grasped by each participant in a different 
manner, at a different level of actualisation.  Architecture, in short, is the battle, the 
agon within which the Idea comes to be. 
 
 
 
Tim Gough 
May 2008 
 
7 p. 195. 
8 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, trans M Lester (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990). 
9 P. 100. 